Internet regulation in China takes place through a series of trade-offs between the imperatives of developing the digital economy and the desire to maintain political stability. The creation of a” Leading Small Group on Internet security and computerization” (Informations and Information on Internet Security and Computerization,Zhongying WangLuo Anquan He Xinxihua Lingdao Xiaozu) by Xi Jinping in February 2014 gave a new impetus to complete the regulatory corpus governing the digital sphere. The new normative provisions on Internet content as well as on the obligations of Internet users and news sites are particularly difficult to understand. Internet regulation is rarely the subject of structured laws; it is mainly the result of multiple decisions issued by the Standing Committee of the People's Assembly or the Supreme Court. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, SIIO has now become the main supervisory body for the Internet. On August 7, 2014, he published a “Provisional Regulation for the Development and Management of Instant Messaging Tools and Public Information Services” ( Jishi Tongxin Gongju Gongzhong Xinyi Fuwu Fazhan Guanli Zhanxing Guanxing Guiding)[6]. The main objective of this regulation is to more precisely regulate tools like Wechat, which were partly exempt from censorship, unlike particularly monitored social networks such as Weibo. In addition, the SIIO has drafted a policy commitment relating to the self-discipline of Chinese Internet actors[7] which was signed by 29 companies in the digital sector. These two measures illustrate the direction taken by China during the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Communist Party Congress held in October 2014.
The Fourth Plenum and Internet Rules
The Fourth Plenum, devoted to “the progress of governance in accordance with the law” (France, Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo)[8], was also an opportunity for the Party to take a stand on the supervision and regulation of the Internet.
Li He notes a profound change in the discourse of power. This now refers no longer to a “legislative system” (, Falü Tixi), but to a “system of regulation by law” (, Fazhi Tixi). According to Ren Xianliang, vice president of SIIO, the old concept was to “sit and operate” ( Zuo Er Lundao) while the new consists in “acting and moving forward” (, Zuo and Xingzhi). Li He agrees, saying that the spirit of the Fourth Plenum is resolutely action-oriented, with the aim of ensuring the rule of law in cyberspace. However, the implications of this policy are questionable. The official rhetoric used by Li He about the authorities' desire to “establish a cyberspace that is healthy, orderly, and harmonious” (,Jianshe Jiankang, Youxu, Hexie of WangLuo Kongjian) does not leave much room for doubt about the purpose of the power to strengthen controls on the Chinese web.
The “WeChat provisions”
As Hu Yong recalls, the dissemination of information to the public is not free in China. Indeed, the right to publish news articles and to comment publicly on current events is reserved for authorized media organizations. Other media, without the quality of a press organization, must content themselves with reproducing the content of these articles without being able to add their own content. The rapid development of new media has therefore forced the Chinese government to broaden its regulations to include “social media” (, Zi Meiti). As the author points out, the political will behind this regulation is to control these media, which can capture an event on the spot and spread the word about it in the public sphere.[9]. Hu Yong discusses the key points of these new regulations.
The “quality of a press organization”
Hu Yong points out that the new regulatory text incorporates the elements used by the Chinese authorities in their media regulation: only accounts held by entities with the “status of a press organization” (now, Xinwen Danwei Zizhi) can write comments on “current events” (, Shizheng Lei Xinwen). The author notes that the need to obtain a “permit” in advance (, Xukezheng) to express yourself on WeChat about the news requires the establishment of a “verification” process（, Shenke), and therefore government control over everyone who speaks out. However, this operation risks hampering the growth of the digital economy, a booming sector in China. The author also highlights the confusing nature of the regulation, which does not specify the procedures and conditions for obtaining a permit. According to the author, this lack of clarity is not trivial in that it would allow the administration to exercise a vague and potentially discretionary power to act on the Internet.
One of the correlates of this new regulation is also the ban on registering on social media or a website using a pseudonym. Anyone who posts or comments on content on the Internet will have to reveal their true identity.[10].
The content
Hu Yong indicates that the rules relating to the content of information, which may or may not be freely published on the Internet, were set out in regulations dating from 2005.[11]. Content that is prohibited or subject to restrictions for persons or entities that have not obtained the status of a media organization covers many areas and, in general, everything related to current events.[12]. Thus, for example, Hu Yong notes that a finance blog could be accused of “spreading pernicious rumours” (, Eyi Chuanbo Yaoyan Xingwei). This article and any comments that refer to a recent news item or news item, including political and economic matters, would fall within the scope of Chinese law if published in China. The concept is therefore very broadly defined.
A regulatory and non-legislative process:
Hu Yong explains that regulations are purely administrative and not the result of a legislative process. Furthermore, it was developed without transparency. The professor highlights the limits of this administrative approach, which does not, in his opinion, make it possible to establish a coherent and clear normative framework. Indeed, the different media, the Internet and the traditional media, being governed by different administrations, obey distinct regulations[13]. Thus, depending on the source of its publication, the same content may fall under several control authorities. The difficulty, as the author notes, is reinforced by the constant creation of new media that do not clearly fit into the classical categories, and whose legal framework is completely uncertain.
Principle commitment: the seven basic lines
The policy commitment letter published by the SIIO lists the various elements limiting freedom of expression on the Internet.
Companies publishing or managing comments on the Internet must respect “the seven baselines” (, Qi Tiao Dixian) formulated at the SIIO meeting on August 20, 2013: the law, socialism, the legitimate interests of citizens, public order, morality, the veracity of information, the interests of the State, and “the nine forbidden ones” (Thus, Jiu Bu Zhun)[14] which are the nine topics that are generally prohibited in the media. It will therefore be their responsibility to track down, in accordance with the law and under the supervision of SIIO, violations of these principles. The objective is “to properly administer websites in accordance with the law in order to tell stories well in China”[15] (France, France, France) Yifa Ban Hao Wangzhan, Jiang Hao Zhonghuo Gushi).
The statement lists the 29 companies that have signed the commitment in principle relating to self-censorship[16]. These companies are Internet news portals linked to news organizations that have obtained official permission to disseminate information on current events.
Defamation and “manhunt” action
Last June, the Supreme Court also published “rules concerning the resolution of civil disputes due to violations of the law through the dissemination of information on the Internet” () last June () Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Liyong Xinxi WangLuo Qinhai Renshen Quanyi Mingshi Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan Wenti de Guiding), in force since last October.
The primary purpose of these rules is to provide the means to act against the spread of rumours on the Internet, and in particular those concerning persons who are the subject of a “manhunt” on the Internet.[17]. As the article by Xu Ai recalls, it is a question of being able to act against an Internet user because of his Posts, but also and simply because he would have “reposted” (, Zhuanfa) content originally posted by another person. Such a rule is particularly severe in that anyone who has reposted a false rumor in any way will incur civil liability. So sanctions no longer apply only to the person behind the misinformation.
The only limitation of this provision, according to the article, relates to handling errors relating to the republication of Posts, the author of an error obviously having the burden of providing proof of his error[18]. These measures, as Xu Ai notes, should be particularly restrictive for the Big V[19], who will find it very difficult to invoke the error. Indeed, their reputation requires them to be extremely careful.
In addition, Xu Ai notes that the new regulations provide for increased liability for Internet service providers if they do not strictly control the information posted on their servers by Internet users.
Conclusion
The SIIO, relatively recent in the Chinese institutional landscape[20], is in the process of occupying a central place in the framework of Internet regulation. For the time being, the “WeChat provisions” are provisional and the final regulations are expected to be presented to the public soon. The various articles demonstrate quite clearly that, behind the desire to establish a cleaner and orderly Internet, there is a strong political will to limit the potential of the Internet as a means of conveying information outside the control of the Party-State. The new normative elements should significantly limit freedom of speech on the Internet in China, but should also be a constraint for the numerous marketing strategies of Chinese and foreign Internet companies operating in China.
Hu Yong[1], “Of the ten WeChat provisions”, Aisixiang, August 7, 2014.
Li He[2], “Promoting the blue sky of the Internet through regulation by law”, The daily life of the people, October 28, 2014.
Xu Ai[3], “Supreme Court releases new social media regulations”[4], Xinhua Wang, October 9, 2014.
State Internet Information Office (SIIO)[5], “SIIO press conference - 29 companies sign the “commitment letter on messages posted on the Internet””, Xinhua Wang, November 11, 2014.
[1] Professor at the Beijing School of Journalism and Communication. [2] Reporter at People's daily life. [3] Reporter at Xinhua. The article is based on the words of Sun Jungong, vice president of the Criminal Affairs Research Center of the Chinese Supreme Court. [4] Social media (, Zi meiti), literally “personal media”, refer to all Internet media that can serve as platforms for individual expression and dissemination. [5] Public agency, created in May 2011, in charge of regulating the Internet in China. [6] The text is often referred to as “the ten WeChat provisions” (, Weixin Shitiao). [7] Principle commitment to “self-discipline relating to Posts and comments on the Internet” (, Gentie Pinglun Zilü Guanli Chengnuo Shu). [8] The term France, Yifa Zhiguo, sometimes translated as “rule of law”, should be distinguished from the expression france, Yifa zhiguo, which could be translated as “government by law” (Rule of Law). [9] On this phenomenon, see Hugo Winckler, “The Chinese Judiciary and the Public Event Space”, Law and Society, no. 86, 2014/1, 175-197. [10] The system of constraints to ensure the effective implementation of this measure is not yet clear. Indeed, a process of systematically authenticating all Wechat accounts would result in significant costs. [11] The regulation published on September 25, 2005 is entitled “Provisions on the administration of Internet news and information services” (, Hulian Wang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guanli Guanli Guiding). [12] Article 2 of the regulation states that “current events include reports and comments related to politics, the economy, military and diplomatic affairs, and other public social affairs, and on sudden social events” (,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Good news, reviews). [13] For example, the same article published in the press and on the Internet will, in the first case, be subject to the regulations and supervision of the State Administration in charge of Press, Publishing, Radio and Film and, in the second case, to the SIIO. In addition, its publication on Weibo and on a news portal will fall under two different regulations (the 2005 regulation or the articles Weibo). [14]（1）Making remarks contrary to the Constitution, (2) Disclosing State secrets, (3) Damaging the honor and reputation of the State, (4) Inciting racial discrimination, (5) Undermining religious policies, (6) Disseminating rumours, (6) Disseminating rumours, (7) Disseminating obscene information, (7) Disseminating obscene information, (8) Insulting people, (9) Any other subject that is contrary to laws and regulations. [15] The expression comes from the title of a press conference held by the SIIO on the occasion of the publication of the commitment letter. [16] The list is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2014-11/06/c_1113150124.htm. It includes major news portals such as Baidu, Sina, Sohu, but also Caixin, a media organization known to be more independent. [17] Some of these manhunts involve Party members accused of corruption. In this regard, see the article: François Quirier, “The debate around “human flesh research””, China Analysis, no. 49, June 2014. [18] In reality, it is difficult to see how it will be possible to produce evidence of such an error. [19] The “Big V” are very influential bloggers working on Weibo, whose articles are generally read by millions of Internet users. Their identity has been verified by Weibo (hence the “V” for “verified”), and their account is approved by the Chinese authorities. See François Quirier, “the debate around 'human flesh research'”, China Analysis, no. 49, June 2014. [20] For an overview of this institutional framework, see: Florence Rountree, “Information Management and Internet Regulation in China,” China Analysis, no. 49, June 2014.
